The Shelf Life of a Safety Climate Assessment: How Long Until the Relationship with Safety–Critical Incidents Expires? by unknown
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Shelf Life of a Safety Climate Assessment: How Long Until
the Relationship with Safety–Critical Incidents Expires?
Mindy E. Bergman • Stephanie C. Payne •
Aaron B. Taylor • Jeremy M. Beus
Published online: 21 January 2014
 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Abstract
Purpose This study investigates safety climate as both a
leading (climate ? incident) and a lagging (incident ?
climate) indicator of safety–critical incidents. This study
examines the ‘‘shelf life’’ of a safety climate assessment
and its relationships with incidents, both past and future, by
examining series of incident rates in order to determine
when these predictive relationships expire.
Design/Methodology/Approach A survey was conducted
at a large, multinational chemical manufacturing company,
with 7,467 responses at 42 worksites in 12 countries linked
to over 14,000 incident records during the 2 years prior and
2 years following the survey period. Regressions revealed
that safety climate predicts incidents of varying levels of
severity, but it predicts the most severe incidents over the
shortest period of time. The same is true for incidents
predicting safety climate, with more severe incidents hav-
ing a shorter predictive window. For the most critical
relationship (climate predicting more severe incidents), the
ability of a safety climate assessment to predict incidents
expires after 3 months.
Implications The choice of aggregation period in con-
structing incident rates is essential in understanding the
safety climate–incident relationship. The common yearly
count of incidents would make it seem that more severe
incidents cannot be predicted by safety climate and also
fails to show the strongest predictive effects of less severe
incidents.
Originality/Value This research is the first to examine
assumptions regarding aggregation periods when con-
structing safety-related incident rates. Our work guides
organizations in planning their survey program, recom-
mending more frequent measurement of safety climate.
Keywords Safety climate  Safety  Leading and lagging
indicators  Measurement
Introduction
The number of individuals killed or injured at work each
year is staggering. In the U.S. in 2011 alone, over 4,600
workers were killed, and nearly three million workers sus-
tained serious injuries while working (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2013). Safety climate, or the relative priority of
safety in an organization as perceived by employees (Zohar
1980, 2003, 2011), is an important contributing factor to
safety-related events in the workplace, including both per-
sonal injuries and organizational and process damages (e.g.,
fires, chemical releases, and property damage; Baker 2007;
Beus et al. 2010; Christian et al. 2009; Zohar 2011).
Accordingly, a deeper understanding of the role that safety
climate plays as a contributing factor to these incidents is
critical to our ability to reduce them.
One understudied challenge in organizational climate
research is the fact that climate changes over time (Neal and
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Griffin 2006; Ostroff et al. 2012), and it is likely to be con-
stantly changing. An assessment of safety climate is only a
snapshot of climate at that particular moment in organiza-
tional history. It is unclear how long that assessment provides
meaningful information about the organization. Although
this is true of nearly any workplace construct, this is espe-
cially problematic for safety climate, as it is an indicator of
risk to the health and well-being of personnel and the orga-
nization. If organizations rely on out-of-date assessments of
safety climate, they might become complacent about the
climate, deploy remedial resources to the wrong units, or
otherwise misread the status of safety in the organization.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the ‘‘shelf life’’ of
a safety climate assessment by determining the optimal
period over which safety–critical incidents should be
aggregated. The term ‘‘shelf life’’ refers to the length of time
a perishable item (e.g., food, drug, etc.) has before it is
considered unsuitable for sale, use, or consumption. Anal-
ogously, we seek to determine the length of time that a
safety climate assessment is suitable for meaningful pre-
diction within an organization, both as the predictor and as a
criterion, before a ‘‘fresh’’ assessment is needed. Essen-
tially, we seek to optimally define the appropriate time
period for studying incidents relative to a safety climate
assessment. We examine two related but conceptually dis-
tinct relationships: safety climate ? incidents and inci-
dents ? safety climate. Thus, we reveal the period of time
into the future that safety climate predicts work-related
injuries and the period of time from the past that work-
related injuries predict safety climate. Both of these rela-
tionships are important to study because of their interde-
pendence, as the former (climate ? incidents) projects the
likelihood of future incidents, while the latter (inci-
dents ? climate) provides information about safety climate
and identifies one of the critical levers in its development.
To that end, we first briefly review the state-of-the-science
on safety climate and its order-dependent relationship with
safety incidents. Second, we discuss some issues to consider
when using incident data and how we deal with these issues
in the current study. Then, we describe our method and
present results that examine the issue of shelf life in a sample
of over 7,700 workers at 42 sites in 12 countries of a large,
multinational chemical processing and manufacturing
company. In the discussion, we begin a conversation about
the shelf life of safety climate assessments in particular and
how these results might be applicable to other psychological
constructs in organizational assessments.
Safety Climate
Safety climate is the shared perception of the policies,
procedures, and practices related to workplace safety
(Zohar 1980, 2011), indicating the extent to which safety is
a workplace priority (Zohar and Luria 2005). In this study,
we focus on safety climate at the site level; thus, we are
examining organizational climate, rather than psychologi-
cal climate (James and Jones 1974; Ostroff et al. 2012).
However, like all climates, safety climate is rooted in the
perceptions of individuals; so, climate perceptions are
measured at the individual level and then aggregated to the
site level (Ostroff et al. 2012).
Safety Climate–Incident Relationship: Temporal
Precedence Matters
Zohar (2003, 2011) advanced the compelling notion that
safety climate should both predict and be predicted by
safety-related incidents in the organization. The former—
that safety climate should predict incidents—is consistent
with the broader literature and theories about organiza-
tional climates (Kuenzi and Schminke 2009; O’Reilly
1989; Schneider and Reichers 1983). However, the latter—
that safety climate should be predicted by safety-related
incidents—has only relatively recently been acknowledged
in the literature (Beus et al. 2010; Zohar 2003, 2011).
Essentially, safety climate should be affected by safety-
related incidents, because they provide information about
the status of safety in the organization (Zohar 2003, 2011).
For simplicity, and consistent with the engineering and
economics literatures (e.g., Stock and Watson 1989; Vin-
nem et al. 2006), we use safety climate as the referent and
refer to its different time-sequenced relationships with
safety incidents as leading (safety climate ? incidents)
and lagging (incidents ? safety climate). Leading indica-
tors signal events ahead of their occurrence (Hopkins 2009;
Mearns 2009). For example, in traffic, amber lights are
leading indicators of a red light. In contrast, lagging indi-
cators reflect prior conditions (Hopkins 2009; Mearns
2009). For example, the unemployment rate is a lagging
indicator of the state of the economy, as increasingly
negative economic conditions precede rises in unemploy-
ment rates. Safety climate is a leading indicator when it is
used to predict work-related incidents that occur in the
future. In contrast, safety climate is a lagging indicator
when predicted by previous safety events in the workplace
(e.g., arrival of new personal protective gear, cancelation of
a safety training program, injuries, fires, and explosions).
Conceptually, safety climate is both a leading and lag-
ging indicator of safety, because it should influence and be
influenced by the safety–critical events in the organization
(Payne et al. 2009; Zohar 2003). Both leading and lagging
relationships are essential to study from a shelf life per-
spective, because the leading and lagging relationships are
interdependent (Payne et al. 2009; Zohar 2003). Safety
climate and safety incidents are ongoing. Neither is static.
520 J Bus Psychol (2014) 29:519–540
123
Instead, they are each in constant, often incremental,
adjustment relative to the other.1
Neal and Griffin’s (2006) study is one of few studies that
assessed both safety climate and incidents more than once.
Although not the primary focus of their work, Neal and
Griffin (2006) reported correlations over a 5-year period
between yearly counts of workgroup accidents and work-
group-level safety climate in years 2 and 4 of the same time
period. Their results showed no direct relationship between
accidents and subsequent safety climate. Further, patterns
between safety climate and subsequent accidents were
difficult to explain (e.g., concurrent relationship between
accidents and climate in year 4 but not year 2 and pre-
dictive relationship between year 2 safety climate and year
5 accidents—but not years 3 or 4 accidents).
In a compelling meta-analysis, Beus et al. (2010)
examined safety climate ? injury relationships and injur-
y ? safety climate relationships separately, at both the
individual and the group level. Of particular interest to this
study was Beus et al.’s (2010) examination of the length of
time over which safety incidents were aggregated as a
moderator of safety climate-incident relationships.
Although the incident time period did not moderate inju-
ries ? organizational safety climate associations, Beus
et al. found that organizational safety climate ? injuries
associations were meaningfully attenuated as this period
lengthened. Thus, safety climate had the strongest negative
associations with subsequent workplace injuries that
occurred in closer temporal proximity to safety climate
assessment. This lends support for the notion that a given
safety climate assessment is predictive of future injuries for
a limited period of time, which might not be well-repre-
sented by a 1-year time period (e.g., Neal and Griffin
2006), and that time period effects might not be symmetric
across leading and lagging relationships.
The current study explicitly addresses this issue by
examining the leading and lagging relationships between
safety climate and incidents over 2-year time periods
before and after a single, organization-wide safety climate
assessment. Specifically, we construct a series of accu-
mulating incident rates, adding 1-month periods to each
successive variable, so that we can determine the optimal
period for constructing incident rates when (a) predicting
safety climate (lagging relationship) and (b) being pre-
dicted by safety climate (leading relationship). We exam-
ine these relationships considering incidents at four levels
of severity. This allows us to begin a discussion regarding
the shelf life of safety climate assessments and thus how
often organizations should be conducting these surveys.
Modeling Incident Data: Constructing Incident Rates
The leading and lagging relationships between safety cli-
mate and incidents can be conceptualized as occurring
across incidents themselves or across incidents over time
(i.e., incident rate2). At first glance, using incidents them-
selves seems like the appropriate approach, as unsafe
events inform workers about the quality of safety in the
workplace. Under this paradigm, the question for the lag-
ging relationship is, ‘‘how many incidents have to happen
(or not happen) for safety climate to be noticeably differ-
ent?’’ The problem with using incidents themselves is that
there is no straightforward way of conceptualizing ‘‘non-
events’’ without referencing another variable. That is, a
‘‘non-event’’ can only be understood in a metric of events.
One solution is to measure incident rate relative to time
(e.g., days passed or hours worked) or number of people
(e.g., number of employees) or both (Bonita et al. 2006),
because rates account for a lack of incidents by describing
the density of incidents relative to some baseline. When
there is a period of time or a population of people in which
no incidents occur, the incident rate is zero, and thus, non-
events can be understood. Thus, incident rates are superior
to incident counts, because incident rates better define risk
by standardizing the unit of comparison and clarifying non-
events (i.e., a rate of zero).
Incident rates constructed over time describe how fre-
quently incidents occur within a given time period. These
incident rates can be compared so long as the time period is
equivalent (e.g., is the incident rate in Year 2 higher or
lower than in Year 1?). However, there is little theoretical
or empirical guidance as to what makes an appropriate time
period. Our study directly addresses the issue of appro-
priate time periods for constructing incident rates.
Incident rates can also be constructed across people,
calculated as the number of incidents relative to the number
of people at the worksite. This idea is not new, as epide-
miological studies of disease typically account for the
incident rates relative to the number of people potentially at
1 This is not to suggest that other factors are irrelevant. Other factors
clearly do matter to safety in the workplace (e.g., seasonal weather
changes that influence the stability of the work processes or the
reliability of the workforce, organization’s operational tempo, and
training programs). However, many of these factors are reflections of
the safety climate, or can reasonably be construed as such by
employees (e.g., safety training programs and operational tempo).
2 Notably, incident rate could also be constructed relative to the
number of events (e.g., number of plane crashes compared to number
of flights and number of automobile accidents compared to miles
driven). However, these were not as relevant to our participating
organization, because it runs continuous chemical processes; so,
production events are not discrete cycles, and production time is
equivalent to time in general. Thus, this notion will not be discussed
further. Suffice it to say, in the following discussion, production
events can be substituted for time.
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risk (Bonita et al. 2006). This is important to model as well,
because of opportunity bias; all else being equal, larger
worksites staffed with more people have higher probability
of having incidents occur than smaller worksites staffed
with fewer people. Analogously, state-level car accident
rates are determined by assessing the number of accidents
relative to drivers,3 rather than the sheer number of acci-
dents. Controlling for the rate of drivers is essential,
because otherwise California and Texas would—just by the
sheer size of the population—have worse accident records
than Montana and Mississippi; yet when the number of
drivers is accounted for, it is clear that the riskiness of
driving is higher in Montana and Mississippi than in Cali-
fornia and Texas (Sauter 2012; US Census Bureau 2012).
However, it is not a choice between constructing inci-
dent rates with time or with people as the denominator.
When constructing incident rates with people in the
denominator, time must also be considered,4 even if only
implicitly. Returning to the issue of car accident rates in
different states, the rate of car accidents cannot be deter-
mined over the number of people without also indicating
the time period in which car accidents are counted. Such
statistics are constructed over some time period, such as the
number of motor vehicle deaths in a year’s time. Even
when such questions focus on the prevalence of events,
such statistics consider the number of car accidents in a
time frame (e.g., a lifetime). As noted above, incidents
need to be accounted for over time, because the lack of
incidents cannot be accounted for without considering
time. Thus, the question becomes, what is the appropriate
time period for constructing incident rates?
The Current Study
The current study addresses this question directly, exam-
ining time periods for incident rates as both the predictor of
safety climate (lagging relationship) and as the criterion of
safety climate (leading relationship). All research on the
safety climate-incident relationship examines a set of
events over an extended period of time, often 6 months or
1 year (e.g., Katz-Navon et al. 2005; Neal and Griffin
2006; Siu et al. 2004; Vinodkumar and Bhasi 2009; Wil-
liamson et al. 1997; Zohar and Luria 2004). Beus et al.’s
(2010) meta-analysis shows that the mean time frame over
which the lagging injury ? climate relationship was esti-
mated in their included studies was 11.24 months (k = 25),
whereas the mean time period over which the leading cli-
mate ? injury relationship was examined was
9.45 months (k = 11). We suspect that researchers decide
to aggregate over these time periods, because (a) it is the
window of access to organizational records the researchers
have been granted and (b) incident data often have low
base rates. The latter, in particular, likely encourages
researchers to aggregate across large time periods in order
to achieve some reliability and variability in the measure-
ment of the events, as the prediction of low base rate events
is a well-documented challenge in the organizational sci-
ences (Blau 1998; Hanisch et al. 1998; Harrison and Hulin
1989; Jacobs 1970; Johns 1998). However, as noted above,
this assumes that the safety climate assessment at one point
in time is still relevant to events occurring over some time
period (e.g., 1 year later). That is, the assumption is that the
safety climate assessment has not ‘‘expired’’ over that time
period. We explicitly test that assumption here.
We chose month-long blocks of incidents as our
smallest time unit. Our aggregation choices depart from
previous research here, as we divide our incident data into
a series of cumulative periods of incidents rates that allow
us to test the shelf life of the leading and lagging rela-
tionships. As we will describe further in the Method sec-
tion, we analyze progressively larger incident data
windows (i.e., 1, 2, 3 months, etc.) to determine when the
safety climate-incident relationship waxes and wanes.
Within our series of analyses is the more common 6-month
and annual incident rate time frames; so, we can see
whether this time frame is too long for optimizing
prediction.
Choosing the ‘‘correct’’ period of time to aggregate
across is difficult, as there is little theory to guide such a
choice and no coherent theory of time in psychology. We
chose 1-month intervals as the aggregation periods for our
models for several reasons. First, 1 month is sufficiently
long to allow for some accumulation of events but still
permitted variation both within and between sites in inci-
dent rate. Second, from a practical standpoint, it is difficult
to envision a scenario in the workplace whereby more
frequent assessment of safety climate across the worksite
population could be reasonably accomplished, connected to
organizational data, and reported back to organizational
stakeholders. Third, research on source memory (memory
for when and/or where an event occurred; Johnson et al.
1993) suggests that workers are more likely to attribute
organizational events to a specific month (e.g., June) than
to a specific week (e.g., the 24th week of the year), because
months represent more salient and cognitively meaningful
time periods relative to weeks which are less easily dis-
tinguished from each other. Although employees in this
study were not asked to indicate in which months events
occurred that informed their psychological safety climate,
3 Car accident rates can also be constructed relative to the number of
miles driven (e.g., number of accidents per 100 million miles).
4 The reverse is not true; incident rates can be constructed across time
without acknowledging the number of people, such as comparing
rates of car accidents across states in a year without controlling for
state population. This, however, is not the best practice, as noted in
the text.
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we felt that it was important to calculate incident rates in a
way that was more likely to mirror the cognitive processes
used by individual respondents.
Consistent with our above arguments, we also included
site size in the incident rate. Because the sites varied
considerably in size, this was essential in order to model
the risk across sites. Thus, the ultimate incident rate was
calculated as incidents per month(s) per employee.
Four Levels of Incident Severity
In addition to aggregating in terms of time and site popu-
lation, we also aggregated our incident data into four levels
of incident severity, following the participating organiza-
tion’s global incident recording standards. We differenti-
ated incidents based on severity because of the possibility
that safety climate-incidents relationships differ in magni-
tude across incidents types. For example, it is plausible that
more severe incidents will be more strongly associated with
subsequent safety climate assessments than minor incidents,
because the occurrence of more severe incidents could more
prominently indicate to employees that safety has a lower
organizational priority (Beus et al. 2010). Further, because
the organization determined that it was important to cate-
gorize these levels of severity separately, we expected that
organizational response to these different events might also
differ, creating different times to expiry for the safety cli-
mate assessment for each incident severity level.
The four levels of incident severity include higher level
of actual damage (Level 2), lower level of actual damage
(Level 1), near misses, and learning events. The specific
operationalizations of these severity levels are described
further in the ‘‘Methods’’ section. We anticipate safety
climate will be negatively related to Level 2 incident rates,
Level 1 incident rates, and near miss incident rates, because
greater attention to safety processes by the organization
should result in both a better safety climate and a lower
number of incidents. In contrast, reporting of learning
events was not required in the participating organization;
instead, the organization encouraged reporting of events,
when employees perceived that information about an event
could provide a learning opportunity within or between
sites. Thus, although it is likely that learning events are
more common at sites with worse safety climate, it is also
possible that more learning events are reported by sites that
have a better safety climate because of their attentiveness
to improving safety.
Summary
This study examines the shelf life of a safety climate
assessment relative to both (a) safety incidents prior to the
safety climate assessment and (b) safety incidents following
the safety climate assessment at the site level of a large,
multinational chemical processing company. Incident rates
are constructed at the site level as the number of incidents
per a particular time period per person, indicating a unitized
level of risk across sites, with the time period changing
cumulatively across the series of analyses in order to
examine changes in the predictive leading and lagging
relationships. Because safety climate serves as a lagging
and a leading indicator, it should capture to some extent the
safety that the organization has experienced in the past and
predict the safety that the organization will experience in
the future, respectively. Due to the reciprocal adjustments
that occur between safety climate and safety incidents, it is
essential to understand safety climate as both a lagging and
a leading indicator of safety, as it is important to know what
has been going on, as well as what is likely to occur in the
future. Our goal is to identify when the safety climate-
incident relationship expires, or at least fails to gain addi-
tional predictive power, indicating that it is time for the
organization to deploy another safety climate assessment.
Thus, we address these two research questions.
Research Question 1: How far into the future does a
safety climate assessment predict a safety incident
rate? That is, what is the shelf life of a safety climate
assessment as a leading indicator?
Research Question 2: How far into the past from a
safety climate assessment does the incident rate pre-
dict that safety climate assessment? That is, what is




For a 1-month period in 2007, a health and safety survey
was administered to personnel of a large international
manufacturing organization. Approximately 14,000
employees were invited to participate. Of those, 8,198
employees responded to the survey (58 % response rate).
The data examined in this study are limited to sites in
which we had survey responses, organizational incident
data, and a site population count, resulting in 7,467
employees at 42 sites in 12 countries.
Employees were sent a survey link embedded in a
message about the health and safety survey by the global
director charged with safety and health issues. Messages
from the global director were also sent to site leadership
requesting leaders to encourage employee participation.
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Banners with information about the survey were also
placed on the organization’s electronic employee portal.
Each week, site leaders were provided with the number of
employees at their site who had completed the survey, with
the goal of creating managerial awareness and some
competition across sites. Reminders were sent to the
employees about the survey approximately once a week.
Surveys were administered in nine languages.
Measures
Safety Climate
Safety climate was assessed with eight items adapted from
Zohar and Luria (2005). All items were administered on a
5-point agreement scale (1 = strongly disagree,
5 = strongly agree). Example items read ‘‘My supervisor
insists we wear our protective equipment even if it is
uncomfortable’’ and ‘‘Site management is strict about
working safely at all times even when work falls behind
schedule.’’ At the individual level of analysis, coefficient
alpha was 0.82. Safety climate scale scores were calculated
as the mean of all nonmissing items; the site level mean
was used in our analyses.
Before conducting further analyses, we tested for suffi-
cient within-site agreement and between-site variability in
safety climate perceptions to determine whether safety
climate could meaningfully be considered to represent a
site-level construct (Bliese 2000). Employees within each
site shared a high level of agreement about safety climate
(median r*wg(j) = 0.93; Lindell et al. 1999). Further,
intraclass correlations demonstrated that meaningful pro-
portions of item variability were explained by group
membership and indicated that site means are fairly stable
(ICC[1] = 0.02; ICC[2] = 0.89). Taken together, these
indices provide sufficient evidence to suggest that safety
climate exists at the site level.
Incident Rates
The organization maintains a database of all reported
safety-related incidents that occur at every plant and clas-
sifies them according to organization-wide standards, based
on severity and nature (e.g., injury, fire, etc.). Incidents for
2 years prior to the survey and 2 years after the survey
were gathered from the organization’s archives. Over
14,000 incidents were included in the database. All inci-
dents are recorded at the site level.
Five levels of incident severity are indicated in the
participating company’s standards. A Learning Event is a
situation that warrants information sharing for its potential
to mitigate future risk and/or improve controls (e.g.,
procedure performed without permit, leaking pipe, and
lockout/tagout procedures not followed). A Near Miss is
defined as a situation or event where given a slight shift in
time or distance or other factors, an incident could have
easily occurred (e.g., lanyard not secured and pump trips).
Level 1 incidents include injuries below Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recordable
guidelines and generally include first aid (e.g., small cuts,
bruises, etc.), which have been previously referred to as
microaccidents in the safety literature (Zohar 2000). Level
1 incidents also involve property damage of less than
$10,000. Level 2 incidents include injuries that meet
OSHA recordability guidelines but are not permanently
disabling or deadly. They include, for example, broken
bones, strained back resulting in missed days of work, or
cuts requiring stitches. Other examples of Level 2 incidents
involve damage between $10,000 and $150,000. Finally,
Level 3 incidents include injuries that are fatal or life
threatening, or cause permanent or long-term disability or
functional impairment. Other examples of Level 3 inci-
dents involve extensive financial damage (greater than
$150,000). Fortunately, there were too few Level 3 inci-
dents in the 4-year period to model in this study. These
various levels of incidents included six general incident
types, including: (a) personal injury/illness; (b) fire/explo-
sion; (c) property damage; (d) transportation (i.e., incidents
involving transit vehicles such as railcars, trucks, barges, or
trailers); (e) security breach; (f) environmental impact
(e.g., chemical spill or release).
Incident rates were calculated by counting the number of
incidents in the time period and dividing by the site popu-
lation for each of the four included incident levels of
severity. Two series of incident rates were calculated, one
for lagging and one for leading relationships, for each of the
four incident levels. Essentially, month-long blocks were
successively added to create a series of incident rates that
included incidents further and further in time from the sur-
vey assessment period (Fig. 1). In the lagging indicator
analyses, the incident rate is the predictor variable. The first
incident rate calculated included only the incidents in the
single month prior to the safety climate assessment; the
2-month lagging predictor calculated the incident rate for the
2 months prior to the safety climate assessment, and so forth
until all 23 months prior to the survey period were inclu-
ded.5 In the leading indicator analyses, the incident rate is
the criterion variable. The first incident rate included the
5 As the month-long survey period spanned two calendar months,
these months were excluded from analyses as they would reflect
concurrent relationships between the assessment and incidents, rather
than safety climate as a leading or a lagging indicator of incidents.
Thus, there are only 23 months of data available prior to the safety
climate assessment.
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single month following the survey assessment period, the
second included the 2 months after the assessment period,
and so forth until all 24 months of incident data were
accumulated into a criterion variable. Thus, there are 23
incident rates for each severity level as predictors and 24
incident rates for each severity level as criteria of safety
climate. Table 1 summarizes the incident data for each
month individually.
Control Variables
Several control variables from multiple sources were
included as covariates, because they represented regula-
tory- and engineering-related risks to safety; safety climate
should contribute to incidents beyond these variables, just
as incidents should contribute to safety climate beyond
these variables. First, the risk associated with the chemical
processes used at each site was controlled; there are four
distinct chemical process businesses at the participating
organization, as well as some office sites. The categoriza-
tion of sites into this variable was determined by our par-
ticipating organization and is part of their corporate
structure; a five-point ordinal scale (0 = office to 4 = most
hazardous chemical process) was used to account for this
risk as more hazardous processes are likely to be associated
with lower perceptions of organizational safety by the
employees at the site. Additionally, dummy variables were
created to represent five corporate regions (Europe, Asia,
Mexico, North America, and South America) due to dif-
ferences in regulatory statutes and oversight as well as
reporting lines within the participating organization. Fur-
ther, survey respondents indicated their typical working
environment (0 = office, 1 = operations), because every
site has office workers, regardless of the chemical pro-
cesses occurring on the site; thus, we controlled for the
proportion of operations workers among survey respon-
dents within site. We also included mean site tenure of the
respondents to account for opportunity for sharedness in
safety climate to develop (Beus et al. 2010). Finally, we
controlled for survey response rate, in case responding was
influenced by safety climate.
Data Analysis
In many ways, our research resembles previous research on
changes in validity coefficients (Henry and Hulin 1987;
Humphreys 1968; Keil and Cortina 2001; Mitchel 1975).
Like this previous research, we are explicitly examining the
role of time in the predictor-criterion relationship. Further,
like this previous research, there are several possible levers of
change that could cause changes in the relationship. In the
predictor–performance criterion relationship, changes could
arise through changes in person’s skills or changes in tasks,
or both (Henry and Hulin 1987; Keil and Cortina 2001). In
our research, changes in safety climate or changes in incident
rate at the site level, or both, could cause changes in pre-
dictiveness. However, our research departs from the previous
line of inquiry in an important way. In the dynamic predictor-
criterion literature, time is a moderator of the predictor-cri-
terion relationship (Keil and Cortina 2001). In the study here,
time is not a moderator per se; instead, we examine time as
part of the incident rate variable, changing the actual calcu-
lation period of incident rates (whether predictor or crite-
rion). Thus, although the changes in the time period are
expected to change the relationship between safety climate
and incident rates, it is not because we have pinpointed a
Fig. 1 Accumulation of safety
incidents to create incident rate
variables
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Table 1 Monthly means and standard deviations of incident rates, per employee (across sites)
Learning events Near misses Level 1 Level 2
M [SD] M [SD] M [SD] M [SD
Month relative to survey
-23 0.5 [1.4] 0.7 [2.5] 1.0 [2.8] 0.2 [0.5]
-22 3.6 [8.1] 2.8 [6.4] 6.0 [10.1] 1.1 [2.9]
-21 3.6 [8.3] 5.5 [8.9] 7.4 [12.9] 1.4 [3.3]
-20 3.5 [6.5] 3.8 [6.5] 8.2 [9.2] 2.5 [5.5]
-19 3.4 [8.2] 5.2 [9.2] 8.4 [15.0] 1.0 [2.2]
-18 5.7 [14.5] 3.5 [8.1] 7.0 [11.4] 1.7 [4.7]
-17 5.2 [17.0] 4.3 [8.3] 10.6 [19.4] 1.0 [3.5]
-16 5.6 [17.6] 3.8 [7.3] 6.5 [8.5] 1.4 [3.8]
-15 4.9 [17.3] 5.8 [13.2] 6.6 [11.4] 1.9 [3.9]
-14 4.7 [13.5] 4.3 [7.9] 8.0 [11.6] 1.8 [4.0]
-13 8.0 [28.7] 4.3 [8.5] 4.5 [8.1] 1.8 [4.0]
-12 4.6 [13.9] 4.8 [9.5] 6.2 [9.6] 2.0 [4.1]
-11 5.4 [17.1] 3.7 [10.3] 5.0 [9.0] 1.7 [3.8]
-10 4.2 [12.8] 4.2 [10.5] 4.3 [7.9] 1.4 [2.6]
-9 5.0 [18.0] 6.0 [12.0] 5.1 [8.6] 1.6 [2.7]
-8 5.4 [17.6] 5.9 [12.9] 4.6 [7.4] 0.9 [1.8]
-7 5.4 [20.2] 4.5 [11.1] 5.4 [10.0] 1.5 [2.8]
-6 4.2 [14.8] 4.5 [13.4] 6.5 [8.4] 1.5 [2.3]
-5 4.9 [18.8] 4.2 [11.4] 5.2 [7.1] 1.0 [2.2]
-4 4.2 [15.1] 7.6 [15.5] 7.8 [19.7] 1.1 [2.0]
-3 5.5 [19.9] 4.3 [11.1] 5.0 [5.9] 2.2 [3.2]
-2 4.6 [17.0] 6.2 [14.2] 7.2 [11.9] 1.4 [2.3]
-1 7.7 [29.6] 6.0 [13.4] 6.2 [10.5] 1.3 [3.7]
Survey assessment period
?1 5.2 [14.6] 5.5 [14.3] 6.7 [13.1] 1.7 [3.9]
?2 7.2 [18.0] 12.3 [32.1] 7.5 [11.4] 1.9 [4.2]
?3 6.8 [17.7] 26.5 [101.1] 6.1 [10.9] 2.8 [7.3]
?4 10.4 [38.6] 15.6 [51.0] 7.9 [15.9] 2.6 [6.1]
?5 6.8 [21.1] 15.6 [57.4] 7.3 [12.5] 1.3 [3.0]
?6 7.8 [19.6] 17.1 [65.4] 7.7 [14.5] 0.5 [1.4]
?7 5.8 [16.8] 6.3 [16.3] 6.5 [9.3] 0.7 [1.7]
?8 8.0 [18.1] 5.4 [11.7] 5.5 [7.9] 1.2 [2.6]
?9 6.6 [16.8] 12.9 [33.7] 5.5 [8.3] 1.5 [3.3]
?10 7.8 [17.1] 11.3 [34.1] 5.6 [9.6] 0.8 [2.3]
?11 7.4 [26.9] 6.4 [11.4] 6.9 [10.0] 1.7 [3.8]
?12 7.6 [23.4] 7.3 [13.9] 5.8 [14.0] 0.6 [1.4]
?13 7.0 [32.0] 4.2 [9.4] 3.3 [7.1] 1.3 [4.1]
?14 11.8 [37.1] 10.5 [26.4] 6.2 [16.7] 0.8 [3.4]
?15 10.3 [30.5] 4.7 [14.1] 6.1 [15.4] 0.9 [2.2]
?16 15.2 [48.1] 7.3 [14.9] 6.3 [13.2] 1.1 [3.5]
?17 10.9 [29.0] 6.5 [13.9] 6.7 [12.1] 1.2 [3.0]
?18 12.0 [29.8] 8.8 [21.5] 5.3 [11.4] 0.2 [0.9]
?19 14.8 [38.2] 8.0 [16.4] 6.8 [18.1] 1.3 [3.5]
?20 13.6 [35.2] 7.1 [14.9] 6.2 [13.8] 0.6 [1.7]
?21 17.5 [47.1] 6.4 [13.7] 6.8 [14.1] 0.5 [1.3]
?22 16.4 [44.7] 7.9 [15.4] 6.8 [17.8] 0.7 [2.1]
?23 19.8 [50.7] 7.1 [14.2] 8.0 [22.0] 0.7 [1.8]
?24 17.2 [43.3] 4.3 [10.3] 7.5 [20.2] 0.7 [2.0]
Note Negative values in the first column indicate the particular month prior to the assessment period; positive values indicate the particular month following the
assessment period
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations among the study variables at the site level
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Tenure (mos) 125.46 48.26
2. Safety climate 4.09 0.20 -0.09
3. Process risk (business type) 2.48 1.17 0.22 0.14
4. Survey response rate 55.64 22.33 -0.33* -0.05 -0.09
5. Working environmenta 0.95 0.22 0.34* 0.37* 0.09 -0.02
6. Lrng event (-13 to -23 mos) 7.36 13.20 0.16 -0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.07
7. Near misses (-13 to -23 mos) 14.45 28.01 0.08 -0.06 0.32* -0.06 0.02 0.19
8. Level 1 (-13 to -23 mos) 21.86 28.99 0.11 -0.22 0.26 0.00 -0.16 0.12 0.84*
9. Level 2 (-13 to -23 mos) 5.45 7.50 0.03 -0.24 0.18 -0.22 -0.02 0.17 0.48* 0.63*
10. Lrng event (-1 to -12 mos) 7.33 11.50 0.01 -0.13 -0.07 0.01 0.10 0.71* 0.11 0.17 0.23
11. Near miss (-1 to -12 mos) 20.57 57.95 0.08 -0.03 0.31* -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.93* 0.79* 0.43* 0.02
12. Level 1 (-1 to -12 mos) 22.17 26.42 0.03 -0.23 0.22 0.00 -0.24 0.09 0.73* 0.94* 0.64* 0.16
13. Level 2 (-1 to -12 mos) 6.00 6.41 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.38* 0.05 0.07 0.55* 0.54* 0.62* 0.01
14. Lrng event (?1 to 12 mos) 14.83 27.55 0.13 0.03 0.30 -0.10 0.01 0.35* 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.43*
15. Near miss (?1 to 12 mos) 38.71 103.45 0.00 0.04 0.36* 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.79* 0.71* 0.39* 0.09
16. Level 1 (?1 to 12 mos) 21.98 29.32 -0.07 -0.21 0.32* 0.00 -0.33* 0.03 0.73* 0.84* 0.57* 0.06
17. Level 2 (?1 to 12 mos) 4.76 5.48 -0.07 0.08 0.22 -0.24 0.03 0.13 0.47* 0.42* 0.47* 0.12
18. Lrng event (?13 to 23 mos) 27.55 58.98 0.13 -0.01 0.27 -0.07 -0.02 0.65* 0.35* 0.24 0.25 0.33*
19. Near miss (?13 to 23 mos) 23.71 43.87 -0.04 -0.12 0.39* -0.02 -0.31* 0.12 0.74* 0.83* 0.56* 0.06
20. Level 1 (?13 to 23 mos) 19.52 30.36 -0.04 -0.26 0.26 -0.09 -0.45* 0.15 0.41* 0.59* 0.43* 0.06
21. Level 2 (?13 to 23 mos) 3.21 4.77 0.00 -0.10 0.28 0.22 -0.20 0.15 0.67* 0.70* 0.62* 0.08
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Tenure (mos)
2. Safety climate
3. Process risk (business type)
4. Survey response rate
5. Working environmenta
6. Lrng event (-13 to -23 mos)
7. Near misses (-13 to -23 mos)
8. Level 1 (-13 to -23 mos)
9. Level 2 (-13 to -23 mos)
10. Lrng event (-1 to -12 mos)
11. Near miss (-1 to -12 mos)
12. Level 1 (-1 to -12 mos) 0.66*
13. Level 2 (-1 to -12 mos) 0.41* 0.58*
14. Lrng event (?1 to 12 mos) 0.11 0.10 0.08
15. Near miss (?1 to 12 mos) 0.87* 0.60* 0.30 0.13
16. Level 1 (?1 to 12 mos) 0.68* 0.90* 0.50* 0.13 0.67*
17. Level 2 (?1 to 12 mos) 0.36* 0.55* 0.71* 0.09 0.41* 0.56*
18. Lrng event (?13 to 23 mos) 0.15 0.26 0.29 0.64* 0.15 0.22 0.34*
19. Near miss (?13 to 23 mos) 0.73* 0.84* 0.50* 0.25 0.70* 0.91* 0.49* 0.35*
20. Level 1 (?13 to 23 mos) 0.33* 0.71* 0.41* 0.24 0.30 0.81* 0.51* 0.36* 0.79*
21. Level 2 (?13 to 23 mos) 0.64* 0.78* 0.70* 0.16 0.55* 0.80* 0.70* 0.43* 0.83* 0.73*
Note N = 42
Mos months, Lrng learning
* p \ 0.05
a 0 = office, 1 = plant
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different time for incident measurement but rather that we
have changed the nature of the incident measurement.
Two sets of analyses were performed at the site level,
the first using safety climate as a leading indicator of
incidents and the second using safety climate as a lagging
indicator of incidents. All analyses were performed using
OLS regressions. In the leading indicator analysis, safety
climate was used to predict the four different incidents
rates, one for each level of incident severity (Learning
Events, Near Misses, Level 1, and Level 2) using each of
the 24 different accumulations of incidents as the incident
rate dependent variable, with the first model including
incident rates for only the month following the survey
period and the 24th model including the incident rate for
the 2 years following the survey period.
In the lagging indicator analysis, the four incident rates in
the 23 months preceding the survey were used to predict
safety climate. As in the leading indicator analysis, each
incident rate was entered in a series of 23 regression models,
but this time as a predictor. The first model used incident
rates from the month preceding the survey, whereas the 23rd
model included the nearly 2-year period prior to the survey.
The lagging indicator analysis was also repeated with all
four incident rates entered together as a block of predictors
in a series of 23 regression models, using the graduated
cumulative incident rates as the predictor variables.
Although the number of incidents and the number of
surveys were both quite large, the analysis was performed at
the site level because the incident data were at the site level.
Thus, the sample size for all regression models was the
number of sites: 42. Given this small sample size and con-
sequent low power, results were interpreted in terms of effect
size rather than in terms of statistical significance. The effect
sizes examined were semipartial r2 (sr2) values, the propor-
tion of variance that is uniquely attributable to the indepen-
dent variable of interest: safety climate assessment (leading
indicator analyses) or the various incident rates (lagging
indicator analyses). Following Cohen’s (1988) rule of thumb
for unique variance accounted for (g2 in the ANOVA
framework), a sr2 of at least 0.01 was considered to be large
enough to be interpreted. Compared to the effects expected
for the set of control variables (including the inherent dif-
ferences in risk across sites based on the chemical process in
use at the site), sr2 of 0.01 is likely to be relatively small.
However, 1 % of the variance in incidents that totaled greater
than 14,000 over 2 years is likely to be practically important
to the participating organization and the people in it.
Results
Table 2 contains the means, standard deviations, and cor-
relations among the study variables at the site level.
Incident rates are included in the table as aggregations over
the first year and over the second year both before and after
the survey period. Thus, for each incident level, there are
four incident rates calculated.
Safety Climate as a Leading Indicator
The first research question asked how far into the future a
safety climate assessment can predict safety climate inci-
dent rates. A series of 24 regressions were undertaken for
each of the four incident rates (Learning Events, Near
Misses, Level 1, and Level 2). Each set of 24 regressions is
distinct, with a different dependent variable.
In all regressions, control variables were entered first
(see Table 3 for a summary across models within each
series of regressions), followed by the safety climate
assessment. Unsurprisingly, a substantial amount of vari-
ance is explained by the set of control variables given that
they reflect engineering-based risk (i.e., different chemical
processes) as well as different regulatory rules and over-
sight. For the leading relationship, the site process risk was
the strongest predictor of incidents for all levels of severity,
except for Level 1 incidents in which process risk and
percentage of respondents who were in operations versus
office locations within site were approximately equally
predictive.
Table 4 contains the sr2 and unstandardized regression
coefficients; Fig. 2 displays the sr2 graphically. We focus
on sr2, rather than regression coefficients, because our
interest is in the variance accounted for by safety climate as
Table 3 Summary of variance accounted for (sr2) by control
variables
Analysis Mean Minimum Maximum
Leading
Learning event 0.454 0.387 0.481
Near miss 0.260 0.220 0.322
Level 1 0.367 0.269 0.403
Level 2 0.312 0.187 0.367
Lagging (series 1)
Learning event 0.331 0.287 0.361
Near miss 0.279 0.264 0.289
Level 1 0.212 0.198 0.259
Level 2 0.267 0.253 0.292
Lagging (series 2)
All four incident rates,
entered as a block
0.227 0.195 0.279
Note Each row represents a different series of regression analyses.
The mean, minimum, and maximum variances accounted for by the
set of control variables are reported for each analysis series. Control
variables included process risk, typical working environment, region,
survey response rate, and mean site tenure
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a predictor of incident rates. As seen in Table 4, very few
of the sr2 were 0.01 or higher in magnitude for Learning
Events or Near Misses, with prediction of only the 5- and
6-month Learning Event variables exhibiting a sr2 greater
than 0.01. Although these values are in the range of small
effects (Cohen 1988), it is difficult to discern why these
two dependent variable time periods, and no others, were
predictable. Thus, our conclusion is that site-level safety
climate assessment is unable to predict the rate of Learning
Events or Near Misses over a 2-year period.
However, all of the regressions predicting Level 1
incident rates had sr2 for the safety climate assessment that
were greater than 0.01. In the month immediately follow-
ing the safety climate assessment, the sr2 was 0.018 and
then quickly increased to 0.052 in the next regression (i.e.,
the 2 months following the safety climate assessment). As
seen in Table 4 and further illustrated in Fig. 2, the sr2
stays between 0.032 and 0.048 for the regressions modeling
Level 1 incidents up through 9-months post-survey, and
then changes in magnitude to around 0.055 (range
0.051–0.061) for the remainder of the 2-year window.
Thus, a single safety climate assessment contributes to the
prediction of Level 1 incidents—the least damaging of
actual incidents (rather than Learning Events or Near
Misses)—for at least 2 years following the survey period.
Thus, the typical year-long accumulation of incidents in
safety climate research appears to be an appropriate time
period for obtaining optimal prediction of incidents.
Finally, an interesting pattern emerged in the prediction
of Level 2 incident rates. For the month immediately fol-
lowing the survey period, the safety climate assessment had
a sr2 of 0.108. However, as additional months were
Table 4 Semipartial r2 and unstandardized regression coefficients for safety climate assessment as a predictor of later safety incidents (i.e.,
safety climate as a leading indicator)
Months Incident rate (dependent variable)
Learning event Near miss Level 1 Level 2
sr2 b sr2 b sr2 b sr2 b
1 0.008 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.018 -0.010 0.108 -0.008
2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.052 -0.029 0.046 -0.009
3 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.043 -0.038 0.053 -0.015
4 0.010 0.033 0.000 0.003 0.034 -0.049 0.019 -0.012
5 0.011 0.045 0.000 0.011 0.039 -0.065 0.010 -0.010
6 0.011 0.052 0.000 0.027 0.033 -0.073 0.011 -0.011
7 0.008 0.046 0.000 0.021 0.032 -0.081 0.009 -0.010
8 0.005 0.041 0.000 0.009 0.032 -0.087 0.012 -0.011
9 0.004 0.040 0.000 0.008 0.037 -0.101 0.004 -0.007
10 0.002 0.026 0.000 0.008 0.048 -0.123 0.002 -0.004
11 0.001 0.025 0.000 -0.012 0.061 -0.146 0.004 -0.007
12 0.002 0.031 0.000 -0.016 0.058 -0.161 0.004 -0.008
13 0.001 0.026 0.000 -0.021 0.057 -0.168 0.007 -0.011
14 0.000 0.009 0.001 -0.055 0.055 -0.182 0.014 -0.016
15 0.000 -0.008 0.001 -0.057 0.051 -0.195 0.008 -0.013
16 0.001 -0.029 0.001 -0.064 0.052 -0.211 0.014 -0.018
17 0.001 -0.035 0.001 -0.078 0.057 -0.231 0.014 -0.019
18 0.002 -0.045 0.002 -0.104 0.058 -0.249 0.014 -0.019
19 0.006 -0.088 0.002 -0.106 0.058 -0.270 0.009 -0.016
20 0.006 -0.093 0.002 -0.110 0.056 -0.284 0.010 -0.017
21 0.007 -0.107 0.002 -0.114 0.052 -0.290 0.010 -0.018
22 0.004 -0.091 0.002 -0.126 0.056 -0.317 0.009 -0.017
23 0.003 -0.084 0.002 -0.138 0.052 -0.330 0.010 -0.018
24 0.002 -0.081 0.002 -0.131 0.054 -0.355 0.009 -0.017
Note Semipartial r2 (sr2) is the proportion of variance that is uniquely attributable to the safety climate assessment, after controlling for site-level
covariates. Unstandardized beta weights (b) are included for each regression. Each sr2 and b cell-pair under the different incident levels
represents a different regression. Each row represents a different number of months accumulated in the dependent variable, whereby 1 month is
the first month following the assessment, 2 months is the 2 months directly following the assessment, etc., with 24 months as the 2 years
following the safety climate assessment
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accumulated into the dependent variable, the sr2 quickly
decreased; by the 4-month incident rate, the sr2 was just
above 0.01, and by the 7-month incident rate, the sr2 was
more often below 0.01 than above. This is not to discount
that there were many cumulative periods of safety incidents
post-assessment that were predicted by the safety climate
assessment, but rather to highlight that incidents in the
period immediately following safety climate assessment
were highly predictable by the assessment compared to the
incident rates that included late months in the 2-year
window. In sum, it appears that Level 2 incidents—more
serious than Level 1, but falling short of catastrophic
events—are more predictable by a safety climate assess-
ment in the very near term following safety climate
assessment than at later dates. Thus, the typical aggregation
of incidents over a year-long period—or even a 6-month
period—would suggest that safety climate can do little to
predict these more severe incidents, yet if incidents were
aggregated over a shorter time period (e.g., 1–2 months
after the survey period), then a much different picture
would emerge.
Safety Climate as a Lagging Indicator
The second research question asked how far from past
incidents that a safety climate assessment acts as a lagging
indicator of safety. Here, safety climate is the dependent
variable. As in the models in which safety climate is a
leading indicator, control variables were entered in the
model first (Table 3). Again, it is unsurprising that control
variables accounted for a substantial amount of variance in
the models. Two different series of analyses were con-
ducted. In the first series, site-level safety climate was
predicted by each of the four incident rates separately,
using the accumulated months incident rate variables for
the 23 months prior to the safety climate assessment; in the
second series, the same variables were used but were
entered in one step as a block to determine the effect of the
total set of incident rates. For Learning Events, Near
Misses, and Level 2 incidents examined separately, the
proportion of respondents in operations positions was the
control variable that had the largest effect on safety climate
assessment. For Level 1 incidents as well as the analysis in
which all four incidents were entered as a block, the site
process risk had a slightly stronger average effect on safety
climate than did the proportion of respondents in opera-
tions positions.
Series 1: Separate Regressions for Each Incident Rate
In contrast to the regressions using safety climate as a
leading indicator, the analyses of safety climate as a lag-
ging indicator show that each of the four incident rates
predict later safety climate. Results for these analyses
appear in Table 5 and Fig. 3. Looking first at the analyses
for Learning Events, for the month immediately preceding
the safety climate assessment, the sr2 is 0.035. In the fol-
lowing regressions for the 2-month through 6-month period
prior to the survey assessment, the semi-partial r2 varies
between 0.036 and 0.064. However, beginning with the
7-month period prior to the survey, the sr2 is 0.097, and for
the remaining period—nearly 2 years—prior to the
assessment, the sr2 for each regression is 0.110 (the
23-month variable) or above, with a peak of 0.133 in the
13-month variable regression. Thus, with Learning Events
as the predictor, with inclusion of more time ahead of the
safety climate assessment—at least up through approxi-
mately 1-year—prediction of safety climate is improved.
Thus, for Learning Events, the typical 1-year aggregation
of incidents would evidence a relationship with safety
climate, but even longer periods (e.g., 2 years) further
optimizes this predictive relationship. Note also that
Learning Events are negatively related to safety climate,
indicating that more Learning Events are related to worse
safety climate. Earlier, we suggested we could not antici-
pate the direction of the Learning Events-safety climate
relationship, because the recording of Learning Events was
encouraged but optional within the participating organi-
zation; thus, recording Learning Events could indicate a
healthy safety climate of a site that focused on learning
from safety-related incidents or could be related to worse
climate, because worse climates would have more incidents
to learn from. The negative relationship between Learning
Events and safety climate supports this latter view, with
more events associated with worse climate.
Turning next to the analyses for Near Misses, nearly all
























Fig. 2 Graphical representation of the semipartial r2 for safety
climate assessment as a predictor of later safety incidents (i.e., safety
climate as a leading indicator)
530 J Bus Psychol (2014) 29:519–540
123
accumulated just prior to the safety climate assessment are
associated with the smallest sr2 (e.g., 0.014 for the 4- and
5-month predictor variables); as more time is accumulated
in the predictor incident rate, the sr2 increased to 0.036 (the
23-month variable). The exception to this trend is the
1 month prior to the safety climate assessment, which had a
sr2 of 0.029. Thus, there might be greater predictiveness in
the very short term than in the near term, but generally
greater predictiveness in the longer-term for Near Misses
as the predictor and safety climate assessment as the lag-
ging indicator. Interestingly, this suggests that the typical
annual aggregation of incidents is no better, and possibly
slightly worse, than using just the month prior to the safety
climate assessment; further, using a 6-month period might
understate the effect of incidents on safety climate, while
using a considerably longer period (e.g., 2 years) accounts
for greater variance in safety climate.
Table 5 Semipartial r2 for safety climate assessment as predicted by prior safety incidents (i.e., safety climate as a lagging indicator)
Months Incident rates (predictor variable)
Learning event Near miss Level 1 Level 2
sr2 b sr2 b sr2 b sr2 b
1 0.035 -5.199 0.029 -2.914 0.024 -3.717 0.058 -14.865
2 0.044 -4.277 0.010 -0.857 0.034 -2.413 0.032 -10.461
3 0.064 -3.081 0.004 -0.409 0.045 -2.214 0.024 -5.786
4 0.036 -1.967 0.014 -0.574 0.046 -1.455 0.015 -4.209
5 0.047 -1.974 0.014 -0.463 0.052 -1.342 0.008 -2.982
6 0.058 -1.845 0.019 -0.449 0.067 -1.401 0.005 -1.928
7 0.097 -2.144 0.016 -0.360 0.067 -1.185 0.000 0.044
8 0.119 -2.076 0.021 -0.355 0.074 -1.142 0.001 0.669
9 0.118 -1.791 0.020 -0.321 0.065 -0.962 0.007 1.742
10 0.115 -1.607 0.022 -0.307 0.073 -0.945 0.008 1.754
11 0.116 -1.373 0.023 -0.297 0.072 -0.871 0.002 0.731
12 0.118 -1.257 0.026 -0.298 0.078 -0.823 0.000 -0.050
13 0.133 -1.037 0.024 -0.272 0.071 -0.731 0.003 -0.777
14 0.131 -0.929 0.026 -0.270 0.072 -0.672 0.009 -1.146
15 0.130 -0.867 0.033 -0.286 0.076 -0.628 0.017 -1.387
16 0.127 -0.758 0.031 -0.265 0.079 -0.598 0.042 -2.117
17 0.124 -0.679 0.032 -0.259 0.093 -0.581 0.052 -2.140
18 0.130 -0.642 0.033 -0.253 0.096 -0.552 0.047 -1.991
19 0.122 -0.615 0.032 -0.239 0.113 -0.554 0.053 -2.063
20 0.119 -0.589 0.032 -0.230 0.110 -0.524 0.064 -2.152
21 0.118 -0.576 0.035 -0.232 0.106 -0.489 0.073 -2.274
22 0.111 -0.553 0.035 -0.229 0.102 -0.461 0.079 -2.315
23 0.110 -0.549 0.036 -0.230 0.103 -0.458 0.080 -2.330
Note sr2 = semipartial r2, or the proportion of variance that is uniquely attributable to the incident rate, after controlling for site-level covariates.
Unstandardized beta weights (b) are included for each regression. Each sr2 and b cell-pair under the different incident levels represents a different
regression. Each column lists a different incident rate variable. Each row represents a different number of months accumulated in the independent
variable, whereby 1 month is the first month prior to the assessment, 2 months is the 2 months directly prior to the assessment, etc., with

























Fig. 3 Graphical representation of the semipartial r2 for safety
climate assessment as predicted by prior safety incidents (i.e., safety
climate as a lagging indicator)
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Level 1 incidents exhibited a pattern similar to Learning
Events. All regressions exhibited sr2 that exceeded 0.01. For
the regressions using the months closest to the survey per-
iod, the sr2 were the smallest for Level 1 incidents, whereas
those regressions using longer time periods before the sur-
vey were associated with higher levels of sr2. The effects
were always smaller than those for Learning Events, but in
the closest month periods and in the longest time periods the
effects were nearly equal. The conclusion from this series of
analyses is that Level 1 incidents are important predictors of
a safety climate assessment, and the ability to predict the
safety climate assessment improves as more time accumu-
lates in the prediction of safety climate (at least, over a
nearly 2-year period). Further, it appears that the common
1-year period for accumulation of incidents would demon-
strate prediction of safety climate, but even longer periods
(e.g., 2 years) further optimize the validity coefficient.
Finally, Level 2 incidents exhibited a U-shaped trend. The
regression for the month immediately preceding the survey
period had a sr2 of 0.058. As months were added to the pre-
dictor variable, the sr2 dropped steadily, falling below 0.010
at the 5-month period and going as low as 0.000–0.002 for the
7-, 8-, 11-, and 12-month variables. However, when the 15th
month before the survey was accumulated into the predictor
variable, the sr2 rose to 0.017 and continued to rise for each
month added through the remainder of the 2-year window,
with a sr2 of 0.080 for the 23-month predictor variable. Thus,
for safety climate as a lagging indicator, very recent Level 2
incidents loom large, as do events that occurred at least
15 months prior. These results suggest that the typical accu-
mulation of incidents into a 1-year period would give the
impression that incidents do not predict safety climate, yet
other time periods—especially when considering only the
nearest term—show that, in fact, incidents do matter.
Table 6 Semipartial r2 for safety climate assessment as predicted by prior safety incidents (i.e., safety climate as a lagging indicator) entered as
a block
Months Incident rates (predictor variables entered as a block) Total
Learning event Near miss Level 1 Level 2
sr2 b sr2 b sr2 b sr2 B sr2
1 0.001 -0.926 0.005 -1.471 0.001 -0.927 0.014 -10.732 0.069
2 0.016 -3.046 0.000 0.042 0.015 -1.752 0.003 -3.659 0.067
3 0.027 -2.556 0.002 0.296 0.021 -1.780 0.000 0.016 0.087
4 0.016 -1.446 0.002 -0.230 0.023 -1.082 0.000 -0.419 0.068
5 0.023 -1.492 0.003 -0.225 0.022 -0.960 0.001 1.055 0.077
6 0.025 -1.311 0.005 -0.243 0.027 -1.078 0.006 2.542 0.097
7 0.046 -1.638 0.004 -0.194 0.023 -0.869 0.016 3.559 0.132
8 0.054 -1.574 0.005 -0.192 0.022 -0.782 0.018 3.437 0.157
9 0.050 -1.340 0.006 -0.189 0.018 -0.638 0.029 3.846 0.159
10 0.040 -1.111 0.006 -0.176 0.021 -0.658 0.029 3.735 0.160
11 0.050 -1.040 0.004 -0.141 0.017 -0.554 0.020 2.765 0.151
12 0.052 -0.983 0.005 -0.146 0.014 -0.471 0.015 2.121 0.149
13 0.085 -0.970 0.006 -0.148 0.009 -0.334 0.016 1.908 0.162
14 0.085 -0.914 0.007 -0.157 0.008 -0.295 0.017 1.857 0.161
15 0.084 -0.892 0.009 -0.166 0.008 -0.269 0.018 1.790 0.164
16 0.068 -0.750 0.007 -0.146 0.007 -0.241 0.007 1.200 0.151
17 0.052 -0.654 0.006 -0.130 0.008 -0.244 0.006 1.053 0.149
18 0.062 -0.636 0.005 -0.121 0.010 -0.275 0.011 1.432 0.158
19 0.038 -0.495 0.002 -0.066 0.015 -0.335 0.005 0.976 0.150
20 0.030 -0.418 0.002 -0.067 0.009 -0.254 0.000 0.186 0.141
21 0.030 -0.397 0.002 -0.070 0.006 -0.196 0.000 -0.210 0.141
22 0.026 -0.358 0.001 -0.059 0.006 -0.183 0.002 -0.460 0.137
23 0.025 -0.349 0.001 -0.056 0.006 -0.185 0.002 -0.487 0.137
Note sr2 = semipartial r2, or the proportion of variance that is uniquely attributable to the incident rate, after controlling for site-level covariates.
Unstandardized beta weights (b) are included for each regression. Total = the sr2 for the set of incident rates together (i.e., the total sr2 attributed
to the set of predictors). Unlike the previous tables, here, each row (rather than each sr2 and b coefficient block) represents a different regression,
with a different number of months accumulated in the independent variables, whereby 1 month is the first month prior to the assessment,
2 months is the 2 months directly prior to the assessment, etc., with 23 months as the nearly 2 years before the safety climate assessment
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Series 2: Regressions Including All Four Incident Rates
Entered as a Predictor Block
In the second series of analyses, site-level safety climate
was predicted by the block of four incident rates simulta-
neously, with a different regression for each of the 23
accumulated month incident rate variables from the period
prior to the safety climate assessment. Results for these
analyses appear in Table 6 and Fig. 4.
As a block (Table 6, last column), the four incident
rates considered simultaneously together were each neg-
atively related to safety climate. As a block, they gained
predictive power as the amount of time included in the
incident rates increased, until the 8-month variable; then,
the effect size remained approximately equal across the
accumulated time periods for the next seven regressions
(all but two sr2 in the range of 0.157–0.164) before slowly
declining to 0.137 in the 23-month variable regression.
Looking individual contributions of the incident rates as
predictors when entered as a block, Learning Events have
the greatest average contribution to predictive power. In
the nearer terms, Level 1 incidents have nearly equivalent
predictive power to Learning Events; in the middle range
of this window, Level 2 events outperform Level 1 inci-
dents and have nearly the predictive power of Learning
Events. Near Misses, on the other hand, never rise to the
0.01 standard and therefore do not appear to contribute to
the prediction of safety climate when the other incident
rates are also accounted for. Thus, it appears that the
block of incidents together are important to the prediction
of safety climate across the entire 2-year window before
the safety climate assessment, with Learning Events as
the most important of the predictors, Near Misses as an
inconsequential predictor, and the usefulness of Level 1
and Level 2 incidents depending on the time window that
is under consideration.
Discussion
The goal of this paper was to determine the shelf life of a
safety climate assessment. Our results indicate that it
depends on whether we are examining leading or lagging
effects as well as the kind of incidents. However, when
considering the most critical relationship where safety
climate predicts the more severe Level 2 incidents, it is
clear that the shelf life of the assessment is extremely short.
The ability to predict such incidents is optimized in the
month following the safety climate assessment and expires
after 3 months. These results indicate that the assumption
(often unstated in organizations) that a safety climate sur-
vey can be conducted annually—like a typical job satis-
faction survey or a health insurance satisfaction survey—
and be assumed to retain its explanatory power for
12 months is incorrect, at least for more threatening events.
If organizations want to be able to predict which sites (or
other sub-groups) are most likely to experience the more
threatening events, then these results suggest that organi-
zations should conduct safety climate assessments quar-
terly at the least and possibly as often as monthly.
As for the other relationships examined, our results
show that there is fairly consistent predictive power of a
single safety climate assessment for less severe incidents
over a 2-year period. In some cases, the consistency is the
lack of predictive ability (i.e., leading effects in predicting
Near Misses and Learning Events), whereas, in others,
there are some steady gains over time as the incident
accumulation period expands (i.e., leading effects in pre-
dicting Level 1 incidents; lagging effect in prediction by
Near Misses, Learning Events, and Level 1 incidents).
Thus, there is no single shelf life of a safety climate survey;
instead, shelf life depends—like validity—on use. Our
conclusions and recommendations about the frequency of
safety climate assessment draw upon the criticality of
predicting more severe events.
Next, we turn to further discussion of the findings of the
current study. Then, we acknowledge some of the limita-
tions of our work. Finally, we turn to broader issues in
understanding shelf life and the factors—beyond the scope
of this work—that might contribute to the expiration of a
climate assessment in its ability to predict, or be predicted
by, workplace events.
The Current Study
There were several interesting findings in our results. First,




























Fig. 4 Graphical representation of the semipartial r2 for safety
climate assessment as predicted by prior safety incidents (i.e., safety
climate as a lagging indicator) entered as a block
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entirely the same incidents that predict safety climate.
Safety climate is a substantial lagging indicator of Learning
Events, but not a leading indicator. Considering incidents
where actual damage occurred (Level 1, Level 2), the
safety climate assessment was an important leading and
lagging indicator over the 2-year period for the less severe
Level 1 incidents; in contrast, safety climate was usually an
important leading or lagging indicator only for more severe
Level 2 incidents that occurred in months closest to the
assessment period. The exception to this was that Level 2
incident rate periods including months more than
15 months prior to the safety climate assessment also
predicted the subsequent safety climate assessment. It is
important to recognize, however, that although the general
effect is the same whether a leading or lagging relationship
is considered for these incidents, the leading and lagging
relationships with these incident rates are not symmetric;
that is, the total variance accounted for is not the same for
the leading and lagging relationships. Finally, safety cli-
mate was never a good leading or lagging indicator of Near
Misses. In brief, our results show that the relationship
between safety climate and incidents depends on several
factors: (a) the kind of incident; (b) the time period over
which incident rates are accumulated; (c) whether safety
climate is a leading or a lagging indicator of incidents.
Although it is important that a safety climate assessment
serve as both a leading and a lagging indicator of safety in
the organization, it is especially important from a practical
standpoint to have safety climate predict incidents. Thus,
one of the most interesting issues in our work is why safety
climate is a leading indicator of some incidents and not
others. In particular, the inability to predict Learning
Events and, especially, Near Misses in our data is of
interest. Near Misses are just that—very near to disaster,
but just missed. That is, they are events that but for slight
differences in circumstances, actual damage would have
occurred; it seems unlikely that the root causes of Near
Misses differ from the Level 1 and Level 2 incidents that
caused actual personal or organizational damage. From a
practical standpoint, it is particularly interesting that root
cause analysis—an iterative investigative process intended
to discover the true causes underlying an event and not just
the most proximal contributors—is encouraged for near
misses (Berry and Krizek 2000; Phimister et al. 2003) in
addition to incidents that cause actual harm, yet near
misses were not predicted by safety climate, nor were they
a good predictor of safety climate, especially when the
other categories of incidents were included (Table 6;
Fig. 4). The lack of relationship between Near Misses and
safety climate is disconcerting. Although beyond the scope
of this paper, it is worth asking whether near misses are
either or both leading or lagging indicator of incidents that
cause actual harm, and if not, why not.
In contrast, safety climate was a lagging (but not lead-
ing) indicator of Learning Events; as the window of
observation increased for previous incidents, safety climate
was better predicted. This suggests that sites might not
have learned from these events, as the relationship between
Learning Events and subsequent safety climate assessment
should be disrupted if (a) the Learning Event is safety
critical and (b) the site resolved the situation. This, of
course, assumes that sites do not ‘‘trade off’’ problems,
such that once a particular Learning Event is learned from,
new and different problems (that were not happening or
were not being recorded during the previous period) arise.
Further, the guidelines at the participating organization
for Learning Events and Near Misses might not be as clear
as desired (unlike Level 1 and Level 2 incidents, which
have clear guidelines and standards, such as cost of prop-
erty damage or whether an injury is required to be reported
back to OSHA). It may be the case that Near Misses can be
categorized as Learning Events, and this is why Learning
Events, but not Near Misses, predict safety climate. There
could be political forces at work inside the participating
organization whereby it is less problematic for site man-
agement to have high rates of Learning Events rather than
Near Misses. Regardless, the results suggest that the
organization does not learn from Learning Events, whether
they were Near Misses or something else, because there is
no disruption in the prediction of safety climate from much
earlier events. Further, it is clear that organizations must be
as concerned about their incident recording processes as
they are about their survey data; incident data are not as
‘‘objective’’ as they seem given that people make judgment
calls about how to categorize and describe events.
Further, safety climate was a useful leading and lagging
indicator of Level 1 incidents over the entirety of the pre-
survey and post-survey 2-year incident windows. This
might be an indication of what the safety climate items
particularly tap in the perceptions of workers, even though
the items were not meant to cue respondents to low-level
injuries (e.g., small abrasions or cuts requiring first aid) and
incidents (e.g., fender-benders on chemical plant grounds,
broken alarms, and minor loss of chemical materials).
Further, it might be the case that because the severity of
these events is rather low (e.g., injuries are not reported to
OSHA and monetary damage is relatively small), the
organization might not attempt to change the conditions
surrounding these events; so, a single safety climate
assessment serves as a long-lasting lagging indicator and
continues to serve as a leading indicator well into the
future. It may also be the case that the causes of less severe
incidents and more severe incidents differ (Wallace and
Vodanovich 2003); for example, it might be that mental
lapses and cognitive failures cause low-level injuries (e.g.,
tripping on a set of stairs) but organizational priorities
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cause severe injuries (e.g., broken bones when falling from
height while conducting maintenance).
Finally, regarding the more severe Level 2 incidents,
safety climate was a substantial leading and lagging indi-
cator, but mostly in the months particularly close to the
survey period. As we will discuss further below, it could be
that these incidents garnered significantly more attention
and responsiveness from the organization relative to the
other categories of incidents. Thus, it could be that the safety
climate assessment quickly expired as a leading or lagging
indicator, because the occurrence of these events led to
organizational interventions that prevented their recurrence
at the particular sites that experienced them. Further, when
incidents prior to the survey period by 15 months or more
were included in the incident window, safety climate again
served as a lagging indicator. It is difficult to speculate why
this might be, but it is possible that investigations of events
take considerable time and become more commonly thought
of as more information is released following investigations.
Alternatively, a site might invest in resources following an
incident to mitigate future similar events, and the pressures
to follow the new protocols—or the financial investments in
those new resources—might run out after a year of imple-
mentation (and implementation does not usually occur the
day after an event but rather in the weeks or months fol-
lowing it), causing those events from 15 months or prior to
become predictive of safety climate. Future research should
investigate this intriguing finding. Regardless, the results for
Level 2 events show that—unlike other incidents—the
common 6-month or annual accumulation of incidents
would suggest that safety climate cannot predict, or be
predicted by, these relatively severe events, yet this result is
driven entirely by the accumulation period. If very short
time periods are used instead, it is clear that the sites at
greater risk for Level 2 events can be identified using a brief
safety climate assessment.
Limitations
Before discussing our results further and linking them to
broader issues in examining the shelf life of a safety cli-
mate assessment, we need to acknowledge some of the
limitations of our research. First, we acknowledge that
although we had a large number of useable survey
responses as well as a vast database of incidents, all
analyses were conducted at the site level, which limited our
sample size to 42. Although this is not an inconsequential
size, it does limit the power available as well as the degrees
of freedom available in regression models. We acknowl-
edge that it is possible that we are overinterpreting some-
what small fluctuations in predictability based on a rule of
thumb from Cohen (1988) rather than being able to test for
significance.
Second, although these analyses were conducted in a
large multinational organization, it represented only one
industry (i.e., chemical processing). There are likely to be
differences in inherent risk, operational tempo, and gov-
ernment or industry regulation that influence the rate of
safety–critical events across industries. The recommenda-
tions we made above regarding the frequency of safety
climate assessments come from an organization in the
chemical processing and manufacturing industry, which is
likely to have a rate of safety–critical events that is higher
than many other industries (e.g., academia, retail sales, and
hospitality). However, because the chemical processing
industry is a high reliability industry where safety incidents
have catastrophic potential (Roberts 1990), it tends to have
stricter safety regulations than other industries where safety
is likewise a critical concern (e.g., construction, agricul-
ture; see www.csb.gov). Thus, this sample could have had
fewer safety incidents over the examined time periods than
a sample taken from a different industry that has a high
level of inherent risk. Our discussion of our results should
be interpreted with this in mind. A possible future research
avenue would be to conduct this kind of research in mul-
tiple industries, using inherent risk factors and previous
industry-level incident rates (e.g., OSHA recordables by
industry, Bureau of Labor Statistics data, or New Zealand’s
Accident Compensation Corporation [see www.acc.co.nz])
as moderators or controls in the analysis (Smith et al.
2006).
Third, we were unable to model the most severe (Level
3) incidents—those that are the most damaging to person
and property—because their rate was too low. This is a
fortunate result for our partner organization, but conse-
quently we are unable to provide any information about
safety climate as a leading or lagging indicator of these
events. Because these are the most safety critical events,
knowing more in particular about how to predict them is
important to the health and well-being of organizations and
their personnel.
Further, we conducted these analyses with only eight
safety climate items. On one hand, this is a limitation,
because we might have missed some important factors in
safety climate that might have provided greater levels of
predictive validity than the few that were included. On the
other hand, this is a strength of our work, because it shows
that a safety climate assessment does not have to be par-
ticularly long to take the pulse of the organization and
predict which sites are more likely to have serious incidents
in the next few months, or even less severe incidents over
the next few years.
Additionally, we chose to use 1-month periods as the
smallest unit to increase in our graduated incident rates.
We certainly could have chosen smaller periods (e.g.,
hourly, daily, weekly, and biweekly) to further refine our
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understanding of the optimal time period for incident rates.
We chose 1-month periods in part for theoretical reasons
(Johnson et al. 1993), but some of this choice was due to
practical reasons, such as the number of regressions that
would have to be presented with smaller time periods.
Certainly, we could have used smaller time periods
between months to further pinpoint optimization in
prediction.
Finally, although we had a rich dataset, there were
numerous additional pieces of information that could have
shed further light on the expiration of the safety climate
measure as a leading or a lagging indicator. As we address
further in the remainder of the discussion, it is not just
incidents that influence safety climate. Information about
these other occurrences could help explain why the safety
climate-incident relationship waxes or wanes over time.
What Factors Influence the Shelf Life of a Safety
Climate Assessment?
In the following, we address several factors that are likely
to influence the shelf life of a safety climate assessment.
This is not meant to be exhaustive but rather a selection of
factors that might be the most promising to consider in
research on the shelf life of safety climate assessments.
Further, this list is not meant to reflect any specific events
that happened in our participating organization; unfortu-
nately, we do not have information about turnover rates,
interventions, or post-incident responses. Instead, we offer
these ideas to open the discussion about the shelf life of
safety climate assessments in the hopes that more critical
examination of the assumptions regarding the aggregation
of incident rates will occur. We anticipate that many of
these issues will also be relevant to assessments of other
types of climate.
Organizational Responses to Incidents
Although incidents should directly influence safety climate
(Zohar 2003, 2011), the organization’s responsiveness to
incidents should also inform safety climate. By respon-
siveness, we mean the post-incident investigation and
intervention efforts, rather than the in-the-moment actions
that attempt to mitigate harm to person and property. Such
responses to incidents could change both the objective risk
in the organization and the safety climate. Regarding
objective risk, organizations could change work processes
or complete maintenance following an incident; these
behaviors would change the objective organizational
environment and work processes, which should have an
effect on the totality of risk to the workers and the orga-
nization. As for safety climate, events that are not treated
seriously at the managerial level but are deemed serious at
the individual level could cause safety climate to worsen
even further than the negative effects of the event itself
because of the mismatch in the priority of safety for
management relative to employees. In contrast, organiza-
tional responses to incidents could mitigate the incidents’
negative effects on safety climate, because the organiza-
tion’s prioritization of safety could be demonstrated and
reinforced. Thus, safety climate should be a lagging indi-
cator of responsiveness to incidents.
Interestingly, safety climate should be a leading indi-
cator of organizational responses to incidents and not just
incidents themselves; sites that are less likely to have
incidents should also be better at responding to incidents
because of their better safety climate. This suggests that
there might be a spiral of gain or loss in the safety climate-
incident relationship, where the good get better and better
while the bad get worse and worse. Unfortunately, we do
not have multiple assessments of safety climate here to
examine this potential relationship.
Other Organizational Interventions
Organizational responses to incidents are not the only
interventions that occur. Whereas responses to incidents
are reactive and can only affect the shelf life of safety
climate as a leading indicator (i.e., future responses cannot
affect past incidents and past climate assessments), other
organizational interventions can influence both the leading
and the lagging relationship. Interventions are designed to
change the organization. If done well, interventions should
not only change the organization, but also the perceptions
of the organization. That is, a well-designed and well-
implemented intervention should change the level of risk,
the actual safety, and the safety climate. Proactive inter-
ventions (such as the launch of a new safety program, the
arrival of new personal protective gear, or the deployment
of additional training, audits, or oversight at organizational
sites that have poor safety climate assessment scores; Zo-
har and Luria 2005) should interrupt the trends in the safety
climate-incident relationship that were ongoing, effectively
making the safety climate assessment expire. For example,
if a large-scale intervention were to be successfully
implemented 6 months prior to the assessment period, then
incidents that occurred 7 months prior to the assessment
period (or earlier) are less likely to predict the safety cli-
mate assessment. The same would be true for a successful
intervention occurring 6 months post-assessment and the
prediction of subsequent incident rates.
The administration of a safety climate survey in and of
itself could be conceptualized and interpreted as a rela-
tively simple safety intervention. It certainly signals to
employees that management is potentially interested in
their perceptions of safety rules and the enforcement of
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them. Changing to a predictable cyclical administration of
a safety climate measure (e.g., monthly or quarterly) could
also be conceived as a safety intervention as it signals a
desire to gather this information more frequently and to
monitor it more closely.
Importantly, the expiration of a safety climate assess-
ment under such conditions might be a useful indicator of
the success of the intervention. Of course, direct evaluation
of the intervention should also occur. But, the inability of a
particular assessment period to link to incident rates
beyond the intervention window could be additional evi-
dence of the intervention’s success (assuming that mean
levels of the safety climate assessment are higher).
Personnel Changes
Further, personnel change could create changes in safety
climate. Because safety climate is shared among employ-
ees, it should remain relatively stable across small numbers
of personnel changes but should change as greater numbers
of personnel changes occur, especially as the number of
key stakeholders (such as management) who turnover
increases (Beus et al. 2010; Zohar 2011). Extensive turn-
over within the organization, a merger, or an acquisition
could render the assessment expired, because it no longer
represents the perceptions of enough of the current popu-
lation (cf. Beus et al. 2012).
Other Factors to Consider When Assessing Shelf Life
Beyond the factors that directly influence the shelf life of a
safety climate assessment, we must also consider the fac-
tors that might obscure the shelf life.
Memory Biases
When considering a safety climate assessment, it is
important to recognize that memory biases play a role in
individual perceptions of climate. For example, negative
events tend to be weighted more strongly than positive
events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), such that incidents
that threatened safety are likely to count more heavily in
perceptions of safety climate than would a safety training
program or the provision of personal protective gear. It is
also important to recognize that memory biases do not only
occur at the individual level. Organizations develop repu-
tational histories, with legends that are passed down across
generations of workers (Chao et al. 1994). New workers
become socialized to know about ‘‘old times’’ and cata-
strophic events—or even more minor events—that hap-
pened prior to the worker’s arrival. Thus, it is possible for
events prior to a worker’s organizational tenure to influ-
ence their perceptions of safety climate.
Although memory biases can only directly intervene in
the lagging relationship, they still influence the leading
relationship because of their influence on assessments of
safety climate and on the practices that arise through
socialization (Chao et al. 1994). To the extent that per-
ceptions of safety climate and its subsequent assessment
are contaminated by memory biases and other mispercep-
tions of the safety of the organization, a safety climate
assessment will have impoverished prediction of future
events. However, to the extent that particular historical
events are highlighted, memorialized and mythologized,
and passed down through workers over time, then both the
safety climate assessment and the actual safety practices
will be affected. Thus, although memory biases in general
should result in less than optimal prediction of incidents by
safety climate, some of the group-level memory practices
should affect both safety climate and safety practices in
similar ways.
Underreporting
Another issue to consider is the extent to which incidents
are reported. Underreporting of safety-related incidents is a
well-documented concern and reality (e.g., Leigh et al.
2004; Probst et al. 2008; Probst and Estrada 2010). As we
noted above, there was more leeway in reporting Near
Misses and Learning Events—overall, as well as how they
were categorized when reported—compared to Level 1 and
Level 2 events, and this might account for the fact that
Learning Events, but not Near Misses, was a predictor of
safety climate.
In any organization, there could be disincentives for
reporting (e.g., time, effort, and peer pressure) or misun-
derstandings over the definitions or minimal criteria for
incidents. In order for organizations to learn from their
safety records, employees need to know what should be
reported, encouraged to do so, and not be punished (for-
mally or informally) for doing so. The shelf life of a safety
climate assessment as a leading or lagging indicator of
incidents can only be determined relative to the incident
data available. Poor incident records will distort the shelf
life of an assessment.
Speed of Change
The speed at which safety climate changes is likely to be
influenced by both the rate of incidents over time as well as
the size/severity of incidents. These are linked to the
operational tempo and inherent risks of an organization,
respectively. By operational tempo, we mean the density of
daily work activity and production at a site (Britt et al.
2005; Castro and Adler 2000). By inherent risk, we mean
that organizations and organizational processes differ in
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their possibility of harm to people, the organization, and
the environment (e.g., chemical processing, construction,
transportation vs. academia, hospitality, and retail sales).
We contend that organizations with a higher operational
tempo are likely to see more rapid change in safety climate
than organizations with a lower operational tempo. Like-
wise, events that are bigger should have a greater effect on
safety climate than those that are smaller in scope;
regardless of the rate of incidents, organizations with
greater inherent risk are more likely to experience severe
incidents than those with a lower inherent risk.
Higher operational tempo should lead to faster changes
in safety climate merely because more happens at that
organization over time. From a safety–critical incident
standpoint, the incident rates should be higher in organi-
zations with higher operational tempos. Further, higher
operational tempo does not have to occur only at the pro-
duction level; some organizations institute training, safety
programs, and other organizational changes at a higher rate
than others. The implication is that organizations with a
higher operational tempo will need to conduct safety cli-
mate assessments more frequently, because they will expire
faster in their organizations, because conditions within the
organization will change more rapidly than at organizations
with lower operational tempos.
Bigger events—events that affect more people or that
inflict greater damage (or create greater improvement, such
as a training program), or both—should also have a greater
effect on safety climate than would smaller events. If cat-
astrophic events do occur, safety climate is likely to rapidly
change—just as massive (successful) undertakings to
improve safety are also likely to change safety climate
relatively quickly, compared to smaller events. Further,
bigger events grab the attention more than smaller events do
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). They also affect or are
witnessed by a greater number of people, causing more
individuals to shift their psychological climates, resulting in
a shift in the organizational climate as well. Relatedly,
shocks (Thompson 1967) as opposed to expected events are
likely to result in more rapid change for safety climate.
Shocks are just that—unexpected jolts to the system to
which the organization and its people must rapidly adjust
and make sense of (Weick 1995; Weick et al. 2005). Change
in safety climate is one of those adjustments. In contrast,
expected changes allow people time to adjust and engage in
sensemaking over time (see also Prochaska et al. 1994).
Can We Use Multiple Safety Climate Assessments
to Predict Incidents?
Another interesting issue to consider in shelf life research
is whether multiple assessment points can increase the
predictiveness of future events. Further, could the change
in climate over time be predictive of future incidents? That
is, might there be an effect of the improvement or disin-
tegration of safety climate over time, in addition to the
direct effect of the level of safety climate at each of those
time periods?
Future research should examine these questions. Fur-
ther, it is possible that technology could create near real-
time assessment of safety climate, finding ‘‘hot zones’’ in
organizations that might best pinpoint critical time periods
and better prevent disasters. Undoubtedly, technology
already exists that allows for people to provide their
opinions or perceptions in real time (e.g., reactions to
candidates during debates). Similarly, organizations could
assess safety climate among employees by asking
employees to set their perception of climate upon arrival
and to change their setting as events occur throughout the
day. Of course, there would be numerous logistical con-
cerns, such as whether these types of measures could dis-
tract workers (putting them at risk) and how to maintain
confidentiality of employee responses.
Conclusion
Current safety climate theory and research do not address
the optimal aggregation period for incident rates, making it
impossible to know when a safety climate assessment
expires as a meaningful leading or lagging indicator of
safety incidents. From a practical standpoint, it is essential
to recognize when safety climate needs to be reassessed—
even if no major incidents have occurred—because of its
ability to improve the predictability of harmful events
beyond objective organizational factors such as size or
inherent risk. Our study begins to identify when a safety
climate assessment expires in order to determine how often
an organization should assess safety climate, a critical
component of its defense against potentially life-threatening
events. Our results show that for the most critical relation-
ship—predicting more severe incidents by safety climate—
organizations should deploy safety climate surveys at least
quarterly if not monthly. Further, we have outlined
numerous ways that a safety climate assessment can expire,
because conditions in the organization have changed. We
hope that this paper spurs safety climate researchers and
safety practitioners to consider investigating the shelf life of
safety climate assessments to determine when they expire
and to subsequently further refine recommendations for the
frequency of safety climate assessment and the aggregation
period for incident rates, in the service of greater health and
well-being for organizations and workers.
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